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CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ENTER ANY SPECIAL
FINDING OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY
AWARDING PART OF DAVE'S SOLE AND SEPARATE PREMARITAL
PROPERTY TO CATHY.
Before addressing the trial court's standards for a distribution of property
between the parties in this case, it should be noted that the trial court first had to
identify and separate out the property owned by third persons whose titles were
clouded by Cathy's unsupported claims of ownership, but over whom the trial court
had no jurisdiction, since Cathy did not join them in the divorce action. The trial
court entered express findings that Neil Child had always owned 75% of the stock in
A-1 Rental and that Blue Water Marine was the owner of the boat which Cathy had
locked away until it was freed via a replevin action. Yet, even after the entry of the
trial court's ruling on ownership, the return of the property to the possession of its
owners, and the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over assets that were never part
of the marital estate, Cathy still asserts that this Court should award her property
owned by those third persons. Neither the standard for distribution of sole and
separate property nor the standard for distribution of marital property has any
application to property belonging to non-party third persons. The trial court acted
correctly when it removed those properties from further consideration.

A. Dave contends that Cathy cannot ignore her duty to marshal all of the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings concerning property
distribution by merely asserting that the weight of the evidence "clearly
preponderates" against those findings.
Both parties cite Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1990 U T App. 224 (Utah App.
1990) as the leading case which instructs the trial court with respect to the treatment
of sole and separate property versus marital property in a divorce distribution.

Burt

provides that the trial court should first identify, label and then remove from division
all sole and separate property before the court attempts to make the presumptive
equal distribution of marital assets. Cathy directs this Court to FJman v. Oilman, 2002
U T App 83; 45 P.3d 176 and argues that she does not have to marshal all of the
evidence in support of the trial court's finding because Elman provides an equitable
exception in cases where the "weight of the evidence clearly preponderates against the
finding".
Dave contends (1) that neither Burt or Elman have any application to property
belonging to third parties and Cathy is required to meet the standard of review for
challenging any finding of the trial court, (2) as to the marital and sole and separate
property distributions, an equitable exception only exists if the trial court enters
express findings that create and explain the equitable exception and (3) without such
express findings of special equitable circumstances by the court, it is Cathy's burden
to marshal all of the evidence that supports the trial court's ruling and then
demonstrate that the weight of all of said evidence "clearly preponderates" against the
ruling of the trial court.

Until the evidence has been properly marshaled for the
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appellate court, it is impossible for it to determine whether the weight of the evidence
clearly preponderates for or against the trial court's findings.
Dave does acknowledge that there can be exceptional circumstances that
would justify a trial court's decision to fashion an equitable exception to either the
presumptive marital or sole and separate distributions; however, in those cases, the
trial court must enter specific findings concerning those exceptional circumstances. It
is not up to the party to decide that she is entitled to a different standard of review.
In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, (Utah App 1993), the court held:
Thus, under Burt, once a court makes a finding that a specific item is
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the
parties unless unusual circumstances, memonali2ed in adequate findings,
require otherwise. See also Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, (Utah App. 1992)
(premarital property and inheritances are viewed as separate property, and,
normally, equity requires that each part} retain the separate property brought
to the marriage).
Additionally, Kellej v. Kellej, 2000 Utah App 236, 9 P.3d 171 provided a
particularly helpful explanation of the requirement of special findings when a court
varies from the presumptive distributions:

The court must approach that allocation in accordance with our decision in Burt v
Burt, 799 P 2d 1166 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). [T]he court should first properly
categorize the parties1 property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other.
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and
fifty percent of the marital property. But rather than simply enter such a decree,
the court should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances..../^, at
1172; accord Hall v. Hall, 858 P 2d 1018. 1022 (I tah Ct App.1993).
Because the court allocated property pursuant to the deciee dissolving the common
law marriage without applying the Burt s) stematic approach or addiessmg
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exceptional circumstances, we reverse that part of the order and remand for further
findings in accordance with Burt.
In the current case, the trial court did not enter any finding of exceptional
circumstances concerning its division of the marital estate and, therefore,
Cathy must challenge the trial court's findings concerning the distribution of marital
property as she would be required to challenge any other finding of the trial court on
an appellate review, namely, by marshaling all the evidence which supports the ruling
so that the appellate court can determine if the weight of the evidence, in its totality,
clearly preponderates for or against the finding of the trial court. Cathy admits that
she has not done the marshaling and has therefore not met her burden under the
standard of review.
B. O n c e the trial court found that Dave's interest in A-1 Rental was his sole
and separate property, the court should have returned that property to him
since the court did not enter any special findings to justify an alternative
award.
The trial court in the case at bar committed the exact error that had been committed
by the trial court in the Kelley case, namely, "the court allocated property . . . without
applying the Burt systematic approach or addressing exceptional citcumstances", (Kelley,
supra).
The court entered the express finding that Dave was the owner of 2 5 % of A-1 Rental
before he married Cathy and that he still owned that same 2 5 % of A-1 Rental at the time of
the divorce. (FF 9, R. 883). Having made that finding, the court should have returned that
property to Dave because the court did not find any special circumstances which justified its
departure from the presumptive distribution.
4

Cathy argues that she provided the court with evidence from which the court could
have made a special finding that she "augmented, maintained or protected Dave's sole and
separate, inherited or donated property". However, the trial court did not make any special
findings that support her position. Dave contends that is because the court also heard
extensive evidence that neither Cathy, nor the marital estate, did anything that augmented,
maintained or protected Dave's premarital stock in A-1 Rental, a " C " corporation.
In is undisputed that Cathy's name was never placed on Dave's interest in A-1 Rental.
It was also undisputed that Cathy never produced any corporate documents that showed her
name as a share holder in said corporation.
In the case at bar, all the benefit of the family's association with the corporation has
flowed from A-1 Rental to Dave and Cathy's personal family and provided them with the
funds to purchase their personal assets. Dave and Cathy never loaned any money to the
corporation nor did their personal family business ever)7 loan any money to A-1 Rental.
(Trans, p. 1751 line 24 through p. 1752 line). They never paid any taxes for the corporation
or its property from their personal assets. (Trans, p. 1751 line 24 through p. 1753 line 13).
Particularly significant was the testimony of Kurt Rich, the CPA for A-1 Rental, as
well as for Dave and Cathy and their personal family business, for over 15 years. He testified
that neither Dave, nor the Dave and Cathy business interests, every contributed to A-1
Rental in any way. (Trans, p. 1751 line 24 through p. 1753 line 13)
Although Cathy claimed that she had supported Dave while he was earning a lesser
income from A-1, her support did nothing to enhance the value of the corporation or even
Dave's share in same as the undisputed testimony was that A-l's growth came as a result of
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Brad Child's fortuitous meeting of the project foreman for the power plant construction
project in East Carbon in the early 1990's and the resulting work with the mining and
construction business that grew out of that encounter. (Trans, p.2419 lines 14-16; Trans, p.
2492 line 24 through p. 2494 line 21).
Cross-appellant asks that this Court overturn the allocation of the trial court
concerning Dave's premarital business interest since the court did not make any findings that
would justify a deviation from the presumptive distribution and award Dave his interest sole
and separate 25% interest in A-l Rental, as well as the increased value of same (not just the
original $5000 investment returned to him by the trial court).
POINT TWO: THE COURT CREATED SOLE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY OUT OF THE CORVETTE WHEN NEITHER PARTY
RAISED THE ISSUE AND WHEN N O EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE
RULING.
Cathy's response to Dave's Point Two indicates that both parties agree that the
Corvette was never intended to be Dave's sole and separate property, even though it
was purchased for his birthday. Both parties appear to agree that the down payment
and all of the monthly payments were paid from the joint family business account
known as the Dave and Cathy Family Rental account, as indicated in the accounting
provided by Dave at trial. Pursuant to the temporary order of the court in this case,
each payment was made and the corvette's loan was paid off on schedule from the
family account. It appears that both parties agree the Corvette was always a marital
asset. Dave asks that the court award the Corvette to Cathy who has been in total
possession of the car for 6 years because she asked for the Corvette at trial and Dave
6

had no objection as long as its value was equalized in the distribution. Dave further
asks that no one be required to repay the family account that made the payments on
the car as it was paid for pursuant to the temporary order with funds from the family
account. Dave requests that an equalization in the marital award be made by adjusting
Cathy's award from the family business account downward based on the value of the
car at the time of the trial and awarding Dave funds in the family business account
that will equalize the value for this alteration made between the parties.
CONCLUSION
Since Appellant has failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and demonstrate why the challenged findings of fact are erroneous or
constitute an abuse of discretion, this Court should decline reviewing Appellant's Issues on
Appeal and affirm the findings of the trial court.
With respect to Cross-Appellant's arguments, this Court should determine that the
trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the distribution of Dave Child's pre-marital,
sole and separate interests in A-l Rental. This Court should declare his interest pre-marital
and remove same from distribution. Dave is entitled to his pre-marital property and also to
its appreciated value.
Finally, both parties acknowledge that the court's ruling with respect to the Corvette
was inconsistent with any of the testimony and it now appears that the parties are in
agreement that this Court should overturn the findings and the award of the trial court with
respect to the Corvette. This Court should award Cathy the Corvette and Dave funds from
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the family account, equivalent to the value of the Corvette at the time of trial, before the
balance of said account is distributed between the parties pursuant to the Decree.
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2008.
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Attorney for Cross- Appellant/Appellee
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